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In the aftermath of the deadly terrorist attacks in India on
the 26th of November, 2008 (26/11), there has been much
discussion on the readiness of the Mumbai Police and Indian
Marine Commandos as the line of defense against such at-
tacks (O’Rourke, 2010; Staniland, 2009). However, little
discussion or post-facto analysis has been devoted towards
understanding the motivation and decision-making process
of first responders in the Mumbai Police department. That(H.R. Rao).
ian Institute of Management
anagement Bangalore. Productio
4.03.001understanding will not only give a better perspective and
appreciation of the tasks conducted in the tense situation
(Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1998; Keinan, 1987) but also help
identify any potential gap that needs to be filled regarding
the police response to terrorist attacks (Keelty, 2008;
Pickering, McCulloch, & Wright-Neville, 2008, pp. 91e111)
in general.
An officer in the police department, whether in the
control room or on the field, makes numerous decisions,
especially during a critical situation like the 26/11 terrorist
attacks. Each of these decisions is driven by a motivation,
which is usually derived from knowledge about the situation
at hand (Worden, 1989), personal experience (Hertwig,
2004) and perception about the situation (Sitkin &
Weingart, 1995). In our study, this is collectively referred
to as Information Processing e a concept that captures
various factors including knowledge, experience, person-
ality, and perception that lead to a motivation which in turn
leads to a decision taken. In this paper we present our
findings about various aspects of information processingn and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Figure 1 Research model.
92 R. Chakraborty et al.from surveys and interviews that were granted to us by
some of the officers of the Mumbai Police department.
Through our findings we aim to explore the information
processing by the Mumbai Police department during the
early moments of the 26/11 attacks. The findings thus
pertain to the decisions taken by the officers, both in field
and in the control room, during the early hours of the
attacks.
Background
Mumbai is the most populous and one of the busiest cities in
India. Mumbai (formerly known as Bombay) is located on
the west coast of India and is the capital of the State of
Maharashtra. It is the financial capital of India and serves as
its main commercial hub. On 26th November 2008 the city
of Mumbai faced an unprecedented terrorist attack that
caused a wanton destruction of human life and property.
A group of terrorists attacked several locations in
Mumbai, primarily in Zone 1, including hotels like the Taj
Mahal Palace hotel and the Trident (formerly known as
Oberoi) hotel. Zone 1 is one of the 12 administrative zones
in Mumbai for its Police Department. The terrorists also
targetted several popular public locations including the
city’s main commuter railway station, the Chatrapati Shi-
vaji railway station, formerly known as Victoria Terminus,
Leopold Cafe, Cama hospital and Nariman House. The
attack was brought under control two days later on the 28th
of November 2008 by the Indian security forces. This attack
was well planned and coordinated and it involved the usage
of digital technology for communication (Oh, Agrawal, &
Rao, 2011; Shankar, Agrawal, & Rao, 2011). This paper in-
vestigates the information processing among the first re-
sponders to this attack from the Mumbai Police
department.
Prior literature
To understand information processing by the Mumbai Police
department at various stages of their mitigation effort
against the 26/11 attackers (Kronstadt, 2008), we referred
to studies conducted in the past within other disaster sce-
narios such as floods (Grothmann & Reusswig, 2006). These
studies have statistically established that protection
motivation (Rogers, 1983) is an important factor in deter-
mining the kind of damage preventing actions that a private
citizen would take when his/her property is at risk of being
damaged by floods. As the phrase implies, protection
motivation is the motivation for protecting somebody or
something valuable that drives actions and decisions which
help in mitigating a disaster situation (Rippetoe & Rogers,
1987) as opposed to escalating or aggravating it. This
motivation, for an individual, comes not only from the
value that he/she attaches to the object of intended pro-
tection but also the threat and risk assessment given an
abnormal situation like a flood or a terrorist attack. These
studies also helped understand what kind of knowledge,
experience and perception of fear and reality affects the
motivation for protecting valuable property and belongings
when there is a looming threat of flood. In this paper we use
these studies as a theoretical basis for grounding ourresearch among the police, a hitherto uncovered area. Each
officer of the Mumbai Police department involved in coun-
tering the attacks, both on the ground as well as behind the
phone lines and computer screens in the control room, had
his/her own protection motivation that drove each decision
he/she took.
Prior literature on emergency situations has brought to
light different forms of threat assessment as well as the
mechanisms for coping with the situation result in
protection-oriented motives. An individual’s decisions dur-
ing an abnormal situation is highly influenced by the
assessment about the possibility of a threat as well as the
potential damage to things that the individual values,
which together can be collectively referred to as a
perceived threat (Cohen, 1979). How an individual expects
a threat to actually materialise, and how harmful the po-
tential threat is to anything that the individual values, are
both largely influenced by the extent of fear in the mind of
the individual. Further, an individual would quite likely
make a decision in a disaster situation based on his/her
estimation of how effective that decision would be and how
much the individual himself/herself would be effective in
executing the decision. Also, a decision maker would
evaluate or attach a cost to the decision to be made. Fig. 1
identifies the various antecedent concepts that guide
effectiveness in the context of emergency situation
response based on prior literature. This research model is
adapted from the Protection Motivation Theory (PMT)
(Rippetoe & Rogers, 1987) and its applications in natural
disasters (Grothmann & Reusswig, 2006).
The assessment of threats during emergency situations
represents the beginning of a fear appeal (Williams, 2012)
that ultimately drives a person to take actions to mitigate
the fear of his/her well-being. In the context of emergency
situations, it is not only the fear but also the amount of
self-efficacy a person has in making and executing the de-
cisions that affect behaviour. If the emergency situation is
terrorism-related, it can be argued that the fear of
terrorism itself (Kowoll, 2012) should play a role in the
actions of the law enforcement officers. This area of
research has only recently been studied through a new
theoretical framework called Terror Management Theory
(TMT) (Shehryar & Hunt, 2005). According to this theory, it
is not just the level of fear about getting injured or losing
valuable assets, but the hint of near-certain death that
drives police and government response to terror attacks
Figure 2 Amount of disaster training e Mumbai Police
department.
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attacks and their responses differentiate terror threats
from threats of natural disasters or other man-made di-
sasters that are much smaller in scale. The very nature of
terror attacks is to inflict damage by death. While the TMT
approach would be useful for future research, in this paper
we focus on information processing effectiveness and the
PMT antecedents.
Data
We conducted our survey and interviews with the officers
of the Mumbai Police department in the August of 2009
using printed questionnaires loosely based on the research
model depicted in Fig. 1. With the approval from official
channels, we handed out these questionnaires to officers
from two of the zones from the Mumbai Police department
that were most actively involved in dealing with the at-
tacks on 26/11 e one, the Control Room, is co-located in
the same premises as the Commissioner of Police (CP) and
other administrative branches while the other, Zone 1, is
located across the street from the Chatrapati Shivaji Ter-
minal (CST) railway station where one of the massacres
happened prior to the hostage situation in the hotels. The
prime reason for selecting these two zones was that Con-
trol Room represents the strategic aspect while Zone 1
represent a tactical aspect of any police response to any
disaster in Mumbai. In other words, by being co-located
with the CP the officers in Control Room were expected
to be instrumental in “calling the shots”, especially in
terms of resource distribution and management. Zone 1
officers played a more tactical role by dealing with the
attackers on the ground or the field (and hence inter-
changeably referred in our study as “field officers”) on a
situational basis. It must also be noted that all the officers
surveyed had strong reading skills in English, which was
essential for answering the questions. The police commis-
sioner gave us the names of 46 officers who were involved
in the immediate response to the terrorist attacks (While
several police constables and sergeants were also involved
in the response, we did not have the ability to contact
them). Forty six surveys were distributed and 31 police
officers from these zones filled out the surveys, resulting in
a response rate of 67%. In addition to the surveys, we
conducted a 3-day semi-structured interview for an
average of 20 min with 15 middle to high-ranking officers
who were directly involved in the mitigation efforts of the
26/11 attacks. These officers were identified for us by the
Mumbai Police department.
Findings
We first present our survey-based findings regarding the
training of the officers in disaster situations. Disasters can
be of two kinds (Berren, Beigel, & Ghertner, 1980; Taylor,
1987): (a) Man-made which includes terrorist attacks and
gang-related violence and (b) Natural which includes
floods, storms, fires and earthquake. Any knowledge about
the distribution of such training is important to interpret
the responses, actions and decisions taken by each officer
on 26/11.Training
Fig. 2 below presents the average number of times a
Mumbai Police officer was trained for handling natural or
man-made disaster situations. The data that we were able
to collect from the Mumbai Police department shows that
except at the sub-inspector and constable levels, Mumbai
Police officers in general seem to be more trained than
those of lower rank in handling terrorist attacks, gang wars
and other man-made disasters.
This implies that perhaps police sub-Inspectors and
constables need to be trained further in handling similar
situations just like those of the other ranks. It is interesting
that the amount of training increases with the rank of the
officer in the Mumbai Police department. It implies that the
higher ranking officers who usually are in a position to make
strategic decisions have sufficient know-how and knowl-
edge of ways of handling disaster situations, which can
make up for sufficient real-time feedback through tech-
nology. Ultimately, the distribution in Fig. 2 shows us that
there has not been any dearth of disaster-response skills in
the Mumbai Police department as far as terrorism and other
human-inflicted crises are concerned. It is however impor-
tant to note that handling man-made disasters requires
more strategic decisions as compared to natural disasters,
which are more based on routine tactical decisions. Man-
made disasters evolve faster than natural disasters in part
due to the availability of technologies, which helps the
culprits innovate. This attribute of man-made disasters
makes it harder for standard operating procedures (SOP) to
keep up with them. It is thus possible that innovative
counter-measures of man-made disasters fall outside the
scope of police documentation and thus may not reach
officers who are in the lower ranks. One contributing factor
for this disparity is the lack of digitisation of all critical
documents in the police department. Standard operating
procedures are usually printed documents and they are
rarely disseminated to the lower rank officers over a digital
media. This lack of digitisation impedes, among other
things, fast updating of the training material and especially
the SOP. The disparity in training based on rank can be
attributed back to the lack of information technology
among all the levels in the police organisation.
We sought information about the distribution of training
for the two categories of disasters among the police officers
Figure 3 Self-efficacy of Mumbai Police officers.
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effect on confidence and self-efficacy (Bahora, Hanafi,
Chien, & Compton, 2008; Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara,
& Pastorelli, 2001) in several domains. In addition, effec-
tive training can help one take away the right lessons from
past events, thus improving one’s threat experience
appraisal.
Self-efficacy
The confidence of the police officers in their personal and
institutional abilities to respond to any kind of threat is
labelled as self-efficacy in the context of our study. This
perception has been proven to have a significant effect in
decision making in general (Bandura, 1994). We surmisedFigure 4 Non-protectivethat the initial responses to a terrorist attack from an
organisation, which is well-trained to deal with similar
situations, would be significantly impacted by the confi-
dence level of the individual officers. This confidence or
self-efficacy is mostly likely derived from the bravery,
personal training, and faith in the strength of the organi-
sation. A law enforcement organisation’s strength, in turn,
is based on the officers’ skills as well as the material sup-
port for them. This material support comprises ammuni-
tion, weaponry and effective communication
infrastructure. In the context of information processing, we
believe the officers, in this study, relied upon their faith in
each of these aspects of their organisation (i.e. the Mumbai
Police department) to be able to effectively process in-
formation during the crisis of 26/11. From our survey, weresponses: Assumption.
Figure 5 Non-protective responses: Avoidance.
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higher self-efficacy during the early hours of the attacks
about their ability to handle the situation.
Maladaptive responses
We wished to understand the emotional and psychological
reactions arising during disaster situations that play a role
in taking decisions but do not help or are not productive in
mitigation efforts. The factors that we considered in this
regard were avoidance and assumption. Collectively they
form maladaptive responses (Rippetoe & Rogers, 1987).
Expectations about a situation that is unfolding, if not close
to accurate, can lead to making pointless if not harmful
decisions. For example, it was commonly seen in our in-
terviews with the Mumbai police officers that their very
early conjectures about the reports of the bombings and
gunfire was that it was a gang shoot-out of some kind. This
notion was based on past experience for most people. Had
this supposition lingered longer in the minds of the Mumbai
officers, it could have resulted in a different sense ofFigure 6 Hourgency and understanding of the gravity of the unprece-
dented nature of the terrorist attacks. From Fig. 4, we see
that according to the Control Room survey data, the Control
Room officers believed that the officers thought that the
attack would end soon and the terrorists would be
captured. But the Zone 1 officials believed otherwise.
Overall, the assumptions made in order to mitigate the
terror attack were more than neutral for the Control Room
and the Zone 1 officials disagreed with such assumptions.
It was possible that a Control Room officer might not
have placed enough importance on monitoring the events
on the ground purely based on the history of Mumbai where
gun-based attacks are often brought under control by field
officers. This mindset, however, would be tantamount to a
non-protective response, especially in the context of an
actual large-scale disaster. Thus “assumptions” could have
hypothetically resulted in a “refusal to monitor”. This kind
of a non-protective response is best described as avoid-
ance. The reason this response is non-protective is because
it often leads to not helping the situation at hand. In Fig. 5,
AV1, AV2 and AV3 refer to the questions asked in our surveypefulness.
Table 1 Questions to measure Availability of Decision Support (DS).
DS1 Information technology support for making decisions was adequate within the police department.
DS2 Location-based information services in the control room were reliable.
DS3 Reports on television were relevant for learning about status of attacks.
DS4 Wireless was reliable for getting immediate access to on-duty officers.
DS5 Wireless was reliable for getting immediate access to off-duty officers.
DS6 Requests for reinforcement could not be returned unless some units were freed up.
DS7 Uncertainty about the location of some officers made initiating coordination with other units harder.
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Zone 1 personnel believed that on the day of the attack,
officers did not underestimate the attacks to be minor.
Also, in such situations both news and social media play an
important role in collecting and disseminating information
(Oh et al., 2011) about the ongoing scenario and there is
high likelihood of avoidance of critical information if media
reports are not trustworthy (Oh, Agrawal, & Rao, 2013). In
one of the interviews, a Control Room officer mentioned
that the media reported wrong information about the death
of a senior police officer and it was corrected later on by
the police control room. They believed that media did not
help in collecting and passing the correct information about
the attacks.
Adaptive responses
In addition to maladaptive responses that were not helpful
in mitigating the attacks and the ensuing disaster situa-
tions, we also investigated adaptive responses (Rippetoe &
Rogers, 1987) by measuring the feeling among the first re-
sponders of the Mumbai police. This feeling of hopefulness
applied to different aspects of the 26/11 attacks including
enormity of attack, counter-attack capabilities and tech-
nology. There is no denying the fact, based on multiple
reports in the media, that the Mumbai police did not have
the advanced arms that the terrorists were carrying. How-
ever, the Mumbai police do have the experience of dealing
with armed conflicts in the past as well as numerous blasts
(especially from 1993). It was thus imperative for us as
researchers to question if such mental response arose in
any officer, especially after reports of mismatch of
weapons started pouring in through media and peer re-
ports. In other words, we had to assess whether officers felt
hopeful about mitigating this event especially based on
their training and their collective experience with past in-
cidents. This feeling has been theoretically shown to usu-
ally result in positive actions or adaptive responses in the
PMT literature (Rippetoe & Rogers, 1987).
The Control Room officials disagreed on the fact that
officers believed that they could counter the terrorists withTable 2 Survey questions to measure Threat Experience Appra
TE1 There was similar or more destruction
TE2 The police procedures during the past
TE3 Experience during a similar attack from
TE4 Mumbai Police personnel have been inv
TE5 Mumbai Police personnel have experien
TE6 After this incident, officers have beenthe existing technologies and weapons. But the field offi-
cers, on the other hand, agreed that the officers were
hopeful about countering and containing the terrorists with
existing weapons and technologies. The higher degree of
hopefulness is demonstrated in Fig. 6. One of the subjects
interviewed in the Control Room realised that field officers
did not have sophisticated weapons. A high hopefulness
increases the likelihood of taking positive steps in mitiga-
tion efforts during a crisis. Hopefulness can also be seen as
a facilitator of confidence. Through training and procuring
better technology and ammunition, it is possible to increase
that confidence which would result in better information
processing during a crisis. Hopefulness is supposed to
project the natural reaction of human beings to the enor-
mity or scale of disasters that seem to be slipping out of
control.
According to Fig. 6, there was a greater feeling of
hopefulness among the Zone 1 officers as compared to
those in the Control Room. This is interesting considering
most Zone 1 officers were physically closer to the fatalities
and as such were getting a much firmer and reality-based
idea about the way events were unfolding. The differ-
ences in making assumptions should also be attributed to
the general optimistic feeling in the Control Room, which is
not always the case in a police precinct like Zone 1. This
optimism automatically translated into what some would
call assumptions about the capabilities, training, and
bravery of field officers as well as the severity of the inci-
dent itself. In other words, Control Room officers demon-
strated more assumptions about the nature of the attacks
during the early few minutes.
A higher score among the Control Room officers in as-
sumptions compared to the Zone 1 officers indicated to us
that Mumbai had not been hit with gunfire and blast in-
cidents for the first time and that perhaps the Mumbai
Police had fortunately developed apathy for knee-jerk re-
action and more caution. Also the assumptions about the
bravery of the police officers turned out to be well founded
as the Zone 1 officers demonstrated lesser degree of
symptoms of avoidance about the unfolding events, which
they were ready to take on right from the beginning.isal (TE).
in an attack in the past.
attacks seemed to be good enough to follow this time.
the past helped prioritise in resource allocation.
olved in simulation of similar attacks.
ce in handling simulated attacks.
thinking a lot about whether Mumbai can be attacked again.
Figure 7 Factors affecting Adaptive Behaviour in Control
Room.
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cision support, threat experience appraisal and protection
motivation, the three antecedents of adaptive behaviour.
Availability of decision support
Decision support systems for law enforcement agencies
include information technology artifacts, well-defined and
well-understood protocols and any other relevant infor-
mation system that can help in effectively making decisions
during crises. We surveyed both the groups of officers to
understand how much the availability of these systems
contributed to such effective decisions. Both the groups of
officers reported identical scores in this part of the survey
thus explaining that appropriate and adequate decision
support systems can help bridge the gap in motivation and
fear and threat estimation between the two groups. They
can also bring about an even amount of positive and
effective decision-making across the gamut of departments
in the police department (See Table 1).
Threat experience appraisal
The next important antecedent of adaptive behaviour is the
extent to which a person can assess the threat in the
context of a similar threat he/she has experienced in the
past. According to Weinstein, Rothman, and NicolichFigure 8 Factors affecting Adaptive Behaviour in Zone 1.(1998), the more severe the past threat experience, the
more that person would be prepared for a similar threat in
future. So while a person assesses the severity of a future or
an ongoing incident through perceived severity, the past is
taken into account through a construct called threat
experience appraisal (TE). The logic behind the inclusion of
the past is that the motivation to act upon a threat to
protect the possible victim of that threat (either self or
civilian) is not only a function of the amount of threat
perceived but also the knowledge and impression left in
one’s mind from a previous and similar experience.
Although coping appraisal should take into account a per-
son’s perceived readiness to cope with the threat, it does
not consider the ability that one can feel in the light of a
previous experience (Grothmann & Reusswig, 2006) (See
Table 2).
Protection motivation
Finally, the most important antecedent for adaptive
behaviour is a person’s motivation to protect something he/
she values. This causality has been proved multiple times in
the past in the context of PMT. Extant literature that have
used PMT have usually centred on threat-generating situa-
tions ranging from man-made and natural disasters to se-
curity in information technology. These studies (Cates,
Dian, & Schnepf, 2003; Herath & Rao, 2009; Liang & Xue,
2009; Neuwirth, Dunwoody, & Griffin, 2000) have empiri-
cally established that protection motivation is an impor-
tant factor in generating intentions to take actions that
mitigate a corresponding threat. As seen in both Figs. 7 and
8, this motivation to protect civilians’ lives and the honour
of the country ranked the highest in influencing the infor-
mation processing decisions taken by both the field and
Control Room officers (See Table 3).
In Figs. 7 and 8, we present our findings about the role
each group of factors in the context of the Control Room
and Zone 1.
Adaptive behaviour
In Figs. 7 and 8, we present our findings about the role each
large group of factors played in determining the under-
taking of the adaptive behaviour as well as the effective-
ness of such behaviour as perceived by the officers of the
Mumbai Police department. Adaptive behaviour would
pertain to any kind of decision by a Mumbai Police officer
that contributed towards the overall mitigation of the
terrorist attacks of 26/11. The similarity in the share of
each factor between the two groups of officers surveyed
confirmed the long-held belief that police officers do not
need to face actual fire to stay motivated and take positive
steps during any disaster situation. In fact, the identical
scores in the role of availability of decision support explain
that whatever could be the gap in motivation and fear and
threat estimation, proper decision support systems that
include technology, well-defined and well-understood pro-
tocols and any other relevant information system, can
effectively bridge that gap and bring about an even amount
of positive and effective decision making across the gamut
of departments in a police organisation.
Table 3 Questions to measure Protection Motivation (PM).
PM1 The officers were determined to rise to the challenge and foil the attacks.
PM2 Death of fellow officers increased motivation to bring down the attackers.
PM3 Reports of civilian deaths in populated areas showed the need for protection of similar and popular places in Mumbai.
PM4 Reports of distributed attacks showed the need to work harder in maintaining coordination between officers.
PM5 After the early hours, officers gathered all information that could possibly help them in subduing the attackers.
PM6 After the early hours, officers gathered ammunition and arms that could possibly help them in subduing the attackers.
PM7 Officers moved to safe locations to reduce police casualties.
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Fig. 9 tells us that Zone 1 officers perceived a slight edge in
terms of amount and effectiveness of all the adaptive de-
cisions they took as compared to the officers working from
the Control Room. This is probably because the people
facing the fire possibly demonstrated higher situation
awareness and took sufficient and effective steps to miti-
gate the highly charged and stressful situation.
The difference in the scores in Fig. 9 is not significant.
This indicates that those who did not come face to face
directly with danger still managed to get an adequate grasp
on the gravity and the dynamics of the unfolding events on
26/11 by virtue of their field experience, their shared
motivation of protecting the field officers, their resolve to
not let the city succumb to a handful of attackers and
finally their resolve to help the city maintain the communal
harmony which was last shaken during the 1993 Bombay
blasts. (See Table 4 for questions to measure adaptive
behaviour and information processing effectiveness.)
Qualitative analysis
In the following subsections we present our general un-
derstanding of information processing of the first re-
sponders, gathered through semi-structured interviews. We
focus on the factors that contributed to the decisions taken
in mitigating the 26/11 attacks by the Mumbai Police and
determined the effectiveness of these decisions as well.
Maladaptive and adaptive responses
The reactions that do not help in a mitigation effort are also
important to understand, to get the complete picture about
the information processing mechanism during the MumbaiFigure 9 Adaptive decisions and perceived effectiveness.Police department’s response to the attacks. The Control
Room officials disagreed on the fact that officers believed
that they could counter the terrorists with existing tech-
nologies and weapons. But the field officers, on the other
hand agreed that the officers hoped to counter the ter-
rorists with existing weapons and technologies.
“I felt that I had never experienced something like this
in Mumbai. Most officers were trained in or had experi-
enced one-strike attacks e not live attacks. Field offi-
cers were not trained or equipped.” [Control Room
Officer]
Both Control Room and Zone 1 personnel believed that
officers did not think that the attacks were minor and they
also believed that the media did not help in collecting and
passing correct information about the attacks. In one of the
interviews a Control Room officer mentioned that the
media reported wrong information about the death of a
senior police officer and it was corrected later on by the
police control room. According to the interviews, the
Control Room officers believed that the officers thought
that the attack would end soon and the terrorists would be
captured. But the Zone 1 officials believed the opposite.
Overall, the assumptions made in order to mitigate the
terror attack was somewhat more than neutral for Control
Room and the Zone 1 officials disagreed with such
assumptions.
“One officer did not know what actually happened at VT
which was because he did not voluntarily switch the
broadcasting channel to South Zone. In fact, most in the
line of duty that day got to know most of the news and
reports from the TV news ticker.” [Field Officer]
Appraisal of threat
It was found that the anticipation about the rise of civilian
death toll, casualties within the security forces and prop-
erty damage was higher among the officers in Zone 1 than
those in the Control Room. This was due to the previous
experience of the field officers and some of them were able
to relate the events to the intelligence reports that they
got prior to the attacks. We tried to estimate and under-
stand how much threat the officers perceived.
“Within the first half an hour, the ACP (Additional
Commissioner of Police) felt it was a terrorist attack,
especially on the basis of connecting the separate at-
tacks in different locations. Arms and jackets were or-
dered from the Control Room for officers on the field.”
[Field Officer]
Table 4 Questions to measure Adaptive Behaviour (AB)
and Perceived Information Processing Effectiveness (EF).
AB1 Fellow officers were informed about options
for self-protection from the terror attacks.
AB2 Officers avoided leaving their units until the
situation was stabilised.
AB3 Officers armed themselves with weapons to
prepare for any eventuality.
AB4 A new protocol was improvised to gather and
disseminate information among the personnel.
AB5 Officers on ground spent more than usual time
trying to get a grasp of the situation.
EF1 The information available helped in delegating
tasks effectively.
EF2 The information requests were reasonable
enough to effectively satisfy.
EF3 The consequences of informing officers on the
field resulted in effective mitigation actions.
EF4 Available infrastructure helped in effective
communication with officers on the ground.
EF5 Existing protocols helped in effective
communication with the public.
EF6 Existing protocols helped in effective
communication with the other agencies.
EF7 Existing protocols helped in effective
communication with the media.
EF8 Existing protocols helped in effectively
stabilising the situation.
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personnel were able to judge the severity of the attacks
almost closely. The officials in the Control Room were able
to judge this based on the number of calls that they got
from the field officers as well as from civilians. From the
data analysis, it can be inferred that officers were more
focussed on their duty rather than getting panic-stricken.
Both the Control Room officers as well as the field officers
concentrated on their duties. Given the field experience,
Zone 1 officers had a slightly higher influence of threat and
severity estimation on arriving at a motivation for taking
positive mitigation steps.
“There were a lot of suspicious calls and in total there
were 1365 terrorist-related calls. There were other calls
that reported about the other incidents. Till 3:30am
there was NO surety about how many attackers were
actually involved.” [Field Officer]
Some of the officials interviewed mentioned that the
previous experience in dealing with other such incidents or
similar incidents helped them. The survey data indicates
that the officers who worked in the Control Room agreed
with this perception but the field officers disagreed. It must
be noted that previous experience also includes simulated
attacks in the past for training purposes.
“I realised the severity of the situation after arriving at
the police station where I observed panic within the
police as well as in the public outside. I had also
received information about blasts in taxis.” [Field
Officer]“News of early death of senior officers definitely raised
the gravity of the entire situation in the minds of the
people in the wireless/control room. The Control Room
felt physically threatened from various pieces of infor-
mation of the attackers being in the vicinity of the Office
of the Police Commissioner compound.” [Control Room
Officer]Self-efficacy and threat experience appraisal
When it came to the comparison between the Control Room
and Zone 1 about the officers’ appraisal of all possible
mechanisms to cope with the evolving threat, our analysis
indicates that the Control Room officials were more confi-
dent about the effectiveness of the actions taken by the
police force. The field officers thought there could have
been more improvements to ensure effectiveness of their
actions and decisions. Since the on-field officers were close
to the attacks and were responsible for quick decision-
making and taking action, the Zone 1 survey data indicates
a higher confidence level in their ability to execute the
decisions that they took during the attacks. However within
a control room, there is not much decision-making taking
place and processes are driven by following standard
operating procedures.
“I first related all these incidents in my mind with the
1993 Bombay blasts and thought of the SOP.” [Field
Officer]
“SOPs were formed after the 1993 blasts and they
defined roles on the basis of ranks during different types
of incidents.” [Field Officer]
“Field experience during the (1993) riots in Mumbai
helped me in interpreting the information from the
phone calls efficiently.” [Control Room Officer]Availability of decision support
There was no unambiguous belief across the board in the
Mumbai Police department about the availability of re-
sources that can affect communication and decision
execution during the attacks. The Control Room officials
seemed to have a neutral stand about the resource avail-
ability for the Mumbai Police, though they thought that
more resources would have been beneficial for their
decision-making. For example, the closed circuit television
(CCTV) feed from a few key locations were fed to the
Control Room and they thought that more CCTV feeds
would have helped to get a broader picture within the
Control Room. On the other side, the field personnel agreed
that the resources were not adequate to deal with such a
massive terror attack. Interestingly, both the groups
neither agreed nor disagreed on whether information
technology helped them to get real-time updates on the
attacks.
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traffic intersections at that time” [Control Room
Officer]
“There is a switch to broadcast to all other police
wireless channels which was probably used during the
26/11 attacks. Information of ‘nakabandi’ (police
blockade) was given to other zones but without com-
plete details. Everybody should have got the news of the
attack because officers of all zones are expected to
switch to other zone channels on their own. This comes
from intuition and experience. If broadcasting switch
was not used to announce the incidents, the other zone
officers still could have been alerted had they turned on
the other zone channels. In total there are eight or nine
radio channels.” [Field Officer]
Adaptive behaviour and perceived information
processing effectiveness
Officers from both the Control Room and Zone 1 agreed
that the availability of information sources and systems in
the police department affected the overall decision
making on the days of the attacks. Both agreed that the
wireless systems were reliable and helped them in passing
on the information between various groups. But according
to the Control Room, the media reports were not reliable
and were more or less misleading. From the data as well
as from the interviews it is evident that the police officers
agreed that their feelings and beliefs inspired the actions
and decisions. Reports that came from various sources also
helped them to think about the need for co-ordination.
The Control Room officials and the field officials neither
agreed nor disagreed that the quality of the information
they got from various sources was good enough to make
proper decisions. Also, both the groups disagreed that
officers waited for a long time to get orders from the
control room.
“On reaching the police station I was informed about
three teams of attackers. My first feeling was that this
was a very unique incident. Upon reaching the police
station I collected a team and headed to the Taj even
without any request of help on that location.” [Field
Officer]
“I called a TV station to correct a wrong report about the
death of a severely injured high ranking officer in the
Cama Hospital.” [Control Room Officer]
The actual mitigation-helping actions (adaptive) and
decisions taken during the attacks were well handled ac-
cording to Zone 1 officials. The Zone 1 officials agreed that
the fellow officers were informed about the options for
self-protection, whereas the Control Room officials had a
neutral stand on this. Both the groups agreed that the
overall effectiveness of the decisions made during the
attack was satisfactory. However, both groups felt that
there could have been more resources and information
systems, which would have helped them much more in
better decision making.Discussion
Based on the survey and interviews we break down the
implications for the Mumbai Police department on different
aspects of decision making and information processing
while responding to early stages of man-made disasters
such as the Mumbai terrorist attacks on 26/11. These rec-
ommendations apply to both field officers like those from
Zone 1 and officers in the Control Room of the police
department.
1. Less Information Barrier: The greater the barrier to
gathering, analysing and disseminating important in-
formation during a crisis situation, the less is the
motivation to take protective and helpful actions
(Russo, Schoemaker, & Russo, 1990). The following are
the managerial implications for helping to develop in
the officers a positive bent of mind during such
situations.
e The police department should work on a protocol for
multi-party verbal communication during crises to
reduce chaos from collective talking. This will help
reduce confusion mostly for the field officers as they
depend solely on verbal cues. The control officers
can still make up for the ambiguity with visual cues
from different sources.
e Adequate number of trained members of a unit gives
confidence as well as facilitates appropriate infor-
mation dissemination along with any necessary
follow-ups. This helps the two groups of officers in
separate ways. Field officers derive strength in
number and can afford to take more calculated risks.
Control room officers can strategise the response
more effectively if the number of trained responders
is adequate. They can also disseminate information
selectively to different groups of field officers in
order to help them focus and not overwhelm them
with every single detail about the overall response.
This can be very helpful in dealing with attacks such
as 26/11.
2. Severity Perception Training: The higher the severity
of the situation a police officer assesses, the more
motivated he/she is to take helpful and protective
steps.
e Media reports cannot be ignored as sources that
convey the magnitude of the incident, especially a
live one. Due to the widespread use of media-
capable Internet-connected smartphones today,
media reports are not only a factor for those sitting
behind computer screens in the control room but
also for those on the field.
e A negative assessment about a situation should not
hamper the confidence in the department’s ability to
mitigate it. Field officers can use the negative
assessment to recalculate their strategies and
perhaps seek more resources from the control room
or other zones. This re-channelling of negative
feelings gets better with training. Similarly control
room officers should not panic based on negative
feedback e all procedures have to updated to
accommodate every kind of contingency situation,
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perception.
e The police department should focus on helping offi-
cers assess the severity of a situation positively in
order to help them get motivated in the right di-
rection as quickly as possible.
3. Confidence Boosting Training: A police officer’s
perception about his/her ability in making the right
calls and executing any order or decision affects his/
her protection motivation highly significantly. We could
thus suggest:
e The police department should improve the protocols
of communication between officers especially for
better understandability of messages being
exchanged. Control room officers, in many situa-
tions, may have more time to process messages than
their field counterparts. The protocols should be
simple yet detailed and exhaustive enough for both
sides to process information effectively and as
quickly as possible.
e Timeliness of instructions and directives is a very
important attribute to improve protection motiva-
tion and must be incorporated in training.
e Confidence building should be made a part of
disaster-related training.
4. Environment of Optimism: Hopefulness improves the
likelihood of taking positive steps in mitigation efforts
in the police department. The managerial implications
from this finding could be the following:
e Demonstrate through training how existing weapons
and technology can be synergistically used to suc-
cessfully, efficiently, and effectively subdue di-
sasters and protect life and property. This
recommendation, we believe, applies more to the
field officers. However, the control room may benefit
from such training by improving their understanding
of event-specific resource allocation.
e Procure better technology, arms, and ammunition to
build more confidence in the officers and demon-
strate their utility to them effectively even outside
training. Confidence of field officers should improve
more with the arms and ammunition while that of
the control room officers will depend more on the
acquisition of state-of-the-art communication infra-
structure, as that is their core “weapon” during a
crisis.
5. Rigorous and Relevant Training: Past experience in
dealing with disasters and threats helps police officers
take correct decisions during a crisis situation. The
implications thus are as follows:
e The police department should put more experienced
field officers on the line before sending in those who
do not have any experience. Similarly, those
handling emergency calls and calls from field officers
during such events should primarily be those that
have been trained rigorously for similar events in the
past. It is likely that getting every officer of the
department up to speed about every scenario will
take time and will prove logistically expensive. That
is why prioritisation is recommended.
e After any disaster, the police department should
require the officers to document (either written orthrough interview) their experience. While control
roomofficers are in abetter position todocument their
experience due to the logs of the communication-
related activities, field officers should be provided
with efficient post-event documentation tools and
debriefing mechanisms.
e Experience from past involvements should be incor-
porated to improve the Standard Operating Pro-
cedures (SOP). This requires capturing both the field
and control-room activities during past events and
creating perhaps two separate SOPs, one for each
group with a significant overlap. Officers in both
types of zones should be trained to promptly recol-
lect and incorporate past communication activities
instead of simply focusing on on-field decisions, ac-
tions and consequences.
e Simulation of man-made disasters should be suffi-
ciently incorporated in training programmes of po-
lice officers. This simulation would be quite different
for the field officers and control room officers. A live
enemy has to be simulated for the former that will
likely involve other field officers. In the case of the
control room, the simulation has to be information-
centric.
6. Decision Support System: Availability of systems and
an environment that supports making and executing
decisions help in adaptive behaviour. This implies the
following:
e Officers must be trained to pick up important
situation-status related information even from out-
lets like TV news reports, especially live ones. This is
more applicable to control room officers who are
surrounded by outlets of information all the time. It
is recommended that an IT framework be in place
that helps transform the information nuggets
manually input by the control room officers into
important signals that can be delivered to appro-
priate field officers as well.
e The police department should help officers utilise all
forms of wireless communication (personal cell-
phones as well as police walkie-talkie). Since no
resource is unlimited, during extraordinary events,
police infrastructure may go down due to unex-
pected call volumes through their network. It is thus
recommended that both control room and field offi-
cers be allowed to fall back on their personal mobile
devices for official communication purposes during
such incidents.
e Police officers must have access to numbers of
important personnel (if not all) for seeking help in
crisis situations.
e Protocol should be improved or incorporated to
effectively support reinforcement requests from the
ground.
e The police department must recruit more officers to
solve potential reinforcement issues.
7. Motivation Boosting Environment and Training: We
found that the more motivated an officer is to protect
life and property, the more likely he/she is to take
helpful or adaptive measures, actions and decisions.
This motivation matters regardless of what a police
officer’s current weapon is. Officers behind a
3 http://www.jccc.edu/home/depts.php/002220/site/floorplans.
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live gunfire from adversaries are equally bound to excel
in their duties if the environment that they work and
train in every day boosts their motivation towards doing
their utmost in every scenario possible. This finding has
an implication on the future recruitment as well as
possible workshops for officers:
e Motivation and determination should be high on the
list of requirements from any officer.
e The police department must do everything in its
capacity to keep that spirit up even during peace
times.
e Officers must be trained to get into an alert mode
even at the slightest hint of threat.
e Officers must be trained to share all possible options
of self-protection with each other in case back up
does not arrive on the ground.
The following prioritised recommendations for informa-
tion processing are based on our findings from the in-
terviews and the survey:
1. Increased police-public engagement featuring “Know
your neighborhood” campaign: According to the Con-
trol Room operators, many callers to the Control Room
are surprisingly ignorant of the street names in their
immediate neighbourhood. A campaign to educate the
Mumbai residents about these street names would be
helpful to first responders when reporting incidents so
that they are not simply providing visual descriptions
(“tall white building near Borivili station”). A challenge
today is the lack of naming schemes for streets and
roads, even in big cities. While mapping services from
Google have been improving in the Indian metropolitan
cities, the lack of names for every single street or road
makes it difficult to identify locations in a uniform
format. Thus a campaign to educate the public about
existing names must also be complemented by a
campaign to achieve a uniform street-based mailing
address format. Many cities have citizen academies
sponsored by law enforcement (an example is Infragard
in Buffalo, NY in the US1). For example, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI)2 in the USA has a citizen’s
academy that includes business, civic, and religious
leaders and educates them about the important issues
in fighting crime and terrorism etc. This increases
awareness in the community and alerts them to po-
tential issues in the face of danger.
2. Alert level and rapid alert escalation model: Mumbai
police should define at least one or two alert levels, and
define standard operating procedures and powers while
the alert levels are in force. The element of surprise is
a key part of the attackers’ strategy. To save lives,
when information about a surprise attack is received,
the police should rapidly escalate the alert level to
initiate the SOP defined for the high alert level. Re-
sponsibility for raising the alert level may be placed on
an officer likely to have the most comprehensive city-1 https://infragardbuffalo.org/about.
2 http://www.fbi.gov/hq/ood/opca/outreach/academy.htm.wide information as well as considerable experience
in dealing with similar situations. In contrast to the
rapid alert escalation model suggested above, de-
escalation should be controlled based on information
gathered when the alert is in force. Some disaster
management communities have different alert levels to
spread information about hazards. For example, the
Dutch Coordinated Response Plan uses the term GRIP
level (1, 2, 3, or 4) depending on the enormity of the
hazard. The higher the GRIP level the greater the re-
sources that are allocated to that particular hazard and
the greater the escalation in terms of responsibility
(Bharosa, Lee, & Janssen, 2010).
3. CCTV feeds to control room, ready availability of
blueprints of large buildings to police, and training of
police in use of fire extinguishers: Most of the attacked
installations in the city had closed circuit TV setups.
However, these were not shared with the police. Or-
ganisations that are likely to be targetted should be
encouraged to share CCTV feeds with Mumbai police to
protect the security interests of these organisations. To
protect business interests, sharing may be limited to
information that is most helpful from a security
perspective. However, it may be useful to have a
mechanism in place so that in case of an emergency,
more information can be shared based on needs.
Further, blueprints and building floor plans (including
waterlines and fire exits) of all large buildings should be
readily (but securely) available to the police. Police
should also be trained in using fire extinguishers.
Blueprints and floorplans3 should be scanned and made
available under a secure server to the police. In addi-
tion the blueprints giving easy exits should be easily
visible to everyone in the building.
4. Broadcast communication across zones: Police
communication in Mumbai is divided into zones. This is
suitable during normal operations. However, when the
alert is in force, it may be useful to create mechanisms
to broadcast information to officers across all or some
selected zones to facilitate mobilisation of resources.
An example from the US is the SAFECOM program.4 Also,
mobile notification systems may be used to inform the
community. An example product is Rave Alert,5 which
delivers thousands of time-sensitive messages within
seconds via text messaging, voice recordings, e-mail,
RSS feeds, instant messaging and popular online social
networking sites.
5. Social media alerts: Twitter was used by the public to
disseminate a lot of information. But it was also used
for starting and spreading rumours. We believe that at
least one police official (trained in social media) or a
police social media unit should track the social media in
order to react as soon as possible (for example: dispel
rumours or initiate an action based on tweets). The
Royal Canadian Mounted Police are using Twitter6 and4 http://www.safecomprogram.gov/SAFECOM/.
5 http://www.ravewireless.com/products/ravealert.
6 h t t p : / / b c . r c m p . c a / V i e w P a g e . a c t i o n ?
siteNodeIdZ50&languageIdZ1&contentIdZ9502.
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mation directly to the public.
6. Psychological counselling: After the incident, psycho-
logical counselling7 should be made available and
encouraged for those in the police force who have lost
close friends or family or fellow workers.
Conclusion
Effective processing of information is an important aspect
of emergency response management, particularly by law
enforcement agencies. Information sources and carriers
coupled with the inherent motivation of emergency
response personnel are key determinants of actions within
these agencies during extreme events. In this paper we
study this information-processing phenomenon demon-
strated by the Mumbai Police department in India in the
early hours of their response to the terrorist attacks of
November 26, 2008.
We investigate information processing using a model
that draws on a theoretical framework: Protection Moti-
vation Theory (PMT). Prior literature has employed PMT to
understand behaviour in the face of threats and risks in
various domains, for instance Grothmann and Reusswig
(2006) study civilian actions that help mitigate flood-
related risks in rural areas. In this paper, we apply PMT to
a context wherein the risk accrues from the terrorist
threats. The PMT framework allows us to recognise the
importance of the perception of that threat as well as the
coping mechanisms that follow. We also investigate the role
of threat-related experience in shaping an individual’s
protection motivation. In future, using PMT, we will explore
using quantitative methods such as failure mode and ef-
fects analysis (FMEA) for analysis of failures in information
processing and decision-making of law enforcement
agencies during similar incidents.
Two kinds of data were captured to help support and
validate our research model. We conducted a survey
through printed questionnaires in two separate zones of the
Mumbai Police department. A semi-structured interview
was also conducted of the available officers who had first-
hand experience in the mitigation of the 26/11 attacks. The
two zones e Control Room (located in the Mumbai Police
headquarters) and Zone 1 e had very different kinds of
roles in these mitigation efforts.
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